Defusing the Nuclear Threat

The risk of a nuclear catastrophe is far greater than we think.

Our ability to reduce that risk is far greater than we imagine.

Too few people are interested in nuclear weapons and there's a much larger “market” of people wanting to improve their relationships, so I’m now working with my wife Dorothie on a new approach that combines the personal with the global. Click here to sign up for information, updates, and opportunities to participate.

Lessons From the Cuban Missile Crisis: Did you know that JFK was taking amphetamines? that American destroyers unknowingly attacked Soviet subs armed with nuclear torpedoes? that we are still engaged in very risky behavior? Learn how we can change that!

How Risky is Nuclear Optimism?: Read Prof. Hellman's paper in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and find out.

Soaring, Cryptography and Nuclear Weapons: How could three such different topics be related?

Archive of email #29 to participants

The Stanford Project

January 25, 2010

For the reasons explained in email #27, I am focusing on trying to create a "pocket of nuclear sanity" at Stanford that can then serve as a model for the nation as a whole.

If you are at Stanford and might be interested in participating, please send me an email at NuclearRisk@stanford.edu and I will add you to that mailing list. Emails to that list may be more frequent than the limit of one per week imposed here, but I'll keep it to a reasonable level.

Whether or not you're at Stanford, if you'd like to hear how the kick off meeting went last Wednesday, a one page summary is available.

I'm currently holding a seminar at Stanford on "Nuclear Weapons, Risk and Hope" and the handouts are available to all. See the NEW RESOURCES section below for a link and some details.

Thank you for your efforts to defuse the nuclear threat.

Martin
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Martin Hellman
Member, National Academy of Engineering
Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering
Stanford University

HOW YOU CAN HELP: As suggested in email #27, consider whether there you are a member of a group where you might replicate the process I am trying at Stanford. For details, see the project description.

NEW RESOURCES: The handouts for my Stanford seminar on "Nuclear Weapons, Risk and Hope" are available online and contain information of interest to this audience in general. In particular, pages 4-5 of handout #1 have additions to "Soaring, Cryptography and Nuclear Weapons" (our most popular resource) that illuminate the link between nuclear war, nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Watch the above page for new handouts every week or so.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: To send a comment, change your email address, or unsubscribe please send me a message at NuclearRisk@stanford.edu. (Please do not reply to this message.)

REPRODUCING THIS PAGE:
Permission is granted to reproduce this page in whole or in part. A reference to http://nuclearrisk.org/email29.php would be appreciated, or in print to NuclearRisk.org.

Archive of email #29 to participants The Stanford Project

Archive of email #29 to participants

The Stanford Project