What is NuclearRisk.org?
NuclearRisk.org is the Internet address (domain name) of a web site dedicated to defusing the nuclear threat. The views expressed here are the sole responsibility of its developer, Prof. Martin Hellman of Stanford's Electrical Engineering Department, and do not necessarily represent those of Stanford University. NuclearRisk.org is not a legal entity and does not seek financial contributions. All we ask is that you consider joining this effort to awaken society to a grave danger and a great opportunity.

How can I participate?
To participate in this effort, just enter your email address in the JOIN US box to the left. You'll then receive occasional emails – no more than one a week – keeping you informed of progress and useful news. Because the Internet is key to rapid dissemination of these ideas, it is extremely helpful if you will email our address (http://nuclearrisk.org) to friends who might be interested.

Do you advocate unilateral nuclear disarmament?
No. Unilateral nuclear disarmament is neither feasible nor desirable. It is a non-issue.

What is your goal?
We are convinced that society's inadequate response to the threats of nuclear terrorism and nuclear war are likely to lead to a catastrophe in the forseeable future. Our goal is to awaken society to the unacceptable risk it faces so that it will then give these threats the attention they deserve. We do that by calling for in-depth, scientific studies of the risk inherent in our current nuclear weapons posture, an almost inarguable first step.

Isn't that goal too limited?
By adopting such a basic goal, we greatly expand the population that can participate. While many individuals involved in this effort have additional goals such as a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the abolition of nuclear weapons, or world peace, this project does not take positions on any of those issues. Rather, we see our goal as a necessary first step which might then allow some or all of those other goals to be achieved.

Risk analysis has the potential to act as a road map to a world in which the nuclear threat is a relic of the past. If the proposed in-depth studies confirm my preliminary estimate that the risk is thousands of times greater than acceptable, we then must chart a path to a world in which the risk is effectively eliminated.

The action you advocate is just talk. What good can that do?
So long as conventional wisdom says that trying to change our nuclear weapons posture is a fool's errand, no concrete steps are possible. Correcting that erroneous impression is the first, key step in the process and is done via talk and other forms of communications. At this stage of the process, "just talk" is one of the most effective actions that an individual can take. Other actions that we encourage are closely related: getting local media coverage (local media is more open to new issues), giving a talk to a church or civic group, and creating discussion groups (either live or web-based) for this issue.

What influence can an ordinary citizen possibly have on such large problems?
Don't we need TV coverage and politicians espousing new approaches to nuclear weapons?
While mass media will be helpful in changing our thinking about nuclear weapons, by definition they can only cover topics that are of interest to a mass audience. After enough of the population has changed its thinking, the mass media will become very important. But before we can reach that point, we first have to reach a much smaller "creative minority." In that early stage of the process, individual action is almost the only useful tool. You can augment your communications with "new media" such as blogs, YouTube, and Facebook that bypass the traditional mass media. By including our Internet address, NuclearRisk.org, such efforts can greatly aid progress.

Similarly, political leaders cannot propose new approaches to national security when the vast majority of the population would see them as laughable or dangerous. Again, we need to reach a critical mass before political action becomes possible. And, again, we first need to reach the creative minority, which is why individual action is key.

What about global warming and environmental degradation?
Don't those issues need our attention?
This question is answered more fully in Section 6 of the primer, but here's a short summary: The underlying problem in all these areas is society's reliance on trial and error, waiting for direct evidence of an error before correcting our societal actions. While that approach was possible in earlier times, it will not work in the nuclear age. If we wait for direct evidence that nuclear deterrence can fail, it will be too late to take corrective action. Because the problem with society's trial and error approach is most easily seen with the nuclear threat, it may be that working on this issue – and then connecting it to the others as described in Section 6 – is the most effective way to work on all issues where the problem is a lack of long-term thinking.

How can I communicate with you?
Because any email address posted on the web becomes a target of spam, we have not posted email contact information here. After you register by entering your email address in the left margin, you will receive an email explaining how to contact us, how to take part in a discussion on Defusing the Nuclear Threat, and how to unsubscribe.

We also encourage participants to develop physical and web-based social networks of their own such as weekly discussion groups, Yahoo or Google groups, Facebook connections, and blogs. To create a cohesive whole, please consider the principles suggested in section 5 of this site's primer and include a link in any other efforts back to this web site, NuclearRisk.org.

What about the Russians? Aren't they returning to their bullying tactics of the Cold War?
The goal of this effort is to get society to assess the risk posed by nuclear weapons and that in no way limits our government's ability to deal with Russian actions. However, it should be noted that the current Russian perspective is the mirror image of ours. They see us as bullying them.

What about North Korea, Iran and other rogue states?
Don't we need to maintain our nuclear deterrent given the threat of further nuclear proliferation?
Just as this effort's goal does not limit the U.S.'s ability to deal with Russian actions, neither does it limit our ability to deal with any other nation.

How can a study estimate the risk associated with nuclear deterrence?
Don't you need at least one failure to do that? How do you account for human behavior?
Similar problems occur in estimating the risk associated with a nuclear power plant design that has never failed, and our proposed studies will use the same techniques as used there. Because of the complexity and uncertainty associated with the deterrence system, the estimate will be only approximate. But, as explained in the Risk Analysis section of this web site, even an approximate estimate will likely suffice to determine whether we are at too great a risk.