Why worry about nuclear weapons now? Isn’t the Cold War over?

As a result of the improved Russian-American relations fostered by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, the world's nuclear stockpile has shrunk by about a factor of three. In that more benign environment, public concern about nuclear weapons has largely evaporated and progress, which was so promising twenty years ago, has slowed to a crawl and is in the process of reversing. Society's complacency is unwarranted because, even after the massive reductions of the last two decades, there are still over 25,000 nuclear weapons in the world. The world is far more dangerous than most people think, and the threat of nuclear terrorism has added a whole new dimension to the risk.

Although clearly different in nature, nuclear terrorism and nuclear war are coupled. One of the possible triggers for a full-scale nuclear war is an act of nuclear terrorism. Particularly if directed against an American or Russian city, the resultant chaos has the potential to push the world over the nuclear cliff, much as a terrorist act in Sarajevo in 1914 was the spark that set off the First World War.

Conversely, the danger of nuclear terrorism is increased by the large number of nuclear weapons. With over 25,000 still in existence and thousands of people involved in their maintenance, storage and security, the chance for error, theft or illicit sale is much too high. More than fifteen years after the bipartisan Nunn-Lugar Act initiated funding for dismantling and protecting "loose nukes" in the former Soviet Union, that effort is only about half complete [NTI 2007].

Loose nukes are not just a problem in Russia. On August 29, 2007, six American cruise missiles with dummy warheads were to be transported from North Dakota to Louisiana. After a day and a half it was discovered that missiles with real nuclear warheads had inadvertently been transferred instead [Washington Post 2007]. Until that mistake was uncovered, these six nuclear weapons were inadequately protected from theft by terrorists and others intent on obtaining such a prize.

Society is paying some attention to the possibility of nuclear terrorism, but section 3 of this primer provides strong evidence that such a disaster is still far too likely. This high risk and slow progress shows that significantly more public concern and attention is warranted for the threat of nuclear terrorism.

While nuclear terrorism gets much less respect that it deserves, the threat of nuclear war has been almost entirely absent as a societal concern since the end of the Cold War. That is unfortunate since Russian-American relations are again becoming very chilly. Over Russian objections, NATO admitted the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999, and added Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004. While the West saw NATO's expansion differently, Russia feels threatened by it.

One of the new NATO members, Estonia, is involved in a deeply emotional conflict with Russia. Having been horribly subjugated when it was part of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Estonia has treated its large Russian-speaking minority (one third of the population) so poorly that Amnesty International issued a report entitled "Estonia: Every third person a potential victim of discrimination." [Amnesty International 2006]. Tensions reached a new high in April 2007 when Estonia removed a memorial to the Russian troops who died defeating Hitler. Seen as a memorial to fallen soldier-liberators by Russia and many Russian-speaking residents of Estonia, the monument was a symbol of past Russian subjugation to the majority of ethnic Estonians. Soon after the memorial was removed, a cyber-attack caused a major disruption of Estonia's Internet access. This attack was believed to have emanated from within Russia, with many people believing the Russian government to be responsible. With Estonia a NATO member, this raised a very serious question:

"If a member state's communications centre is attacked with a missile, you call it an act of war. So what do you call it if the same installation is disabled with a cyber-attack?” asks a senior [NATO] official in Brussels. Estonia's defense ministry goes further: a spokesman compares the attacks to those launched against America on September 11th 2001. [The Economist, May 10, 2007]

If these tensions between Russia and Estonia escalate into a major crisis, we could face the prospect of having to either renege on our NATO obligations or threaten actions that would expose the entire United States to a nuclear attack. No one wants such a confrontation, but nuclear weapons lose all utility if we admit we can never use them. The U.S., Russia, and all other nuclear weapons states therefore behave as if these weapons have military utility, which is a very dangerous game in times of crisis.

NOTE ADDED AUGUST 2008: Recent developments have made the former Soviet Republic of Georgia an even more dangerous flashpoint than Estonia. For details see email #5 sent to participants in this project.

Another irritant to relations is the differing Russian and American views of our deployment of a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. The U.S. says that the system is intended solely to protect against the possibility of an Iranian attack, so Russia has nothing to fear. Russia sees the deployment as a major new threat, and questions whether the missiles might really be offensive in nature [Moscow News Weekly, October 25, 2007]. Even former President Mikhail Gorbachev, hardly a Cold Warrior, has voiced concern:

Milos Zeman, the former Czech prime minister, said, 'What kind of Iran threat do you see? This is a system that is being created against Russia,' ... I don't think Zeman is alone in seeing this. We see this as well as he sees it [targeting Russia, not Iran]. [Moscow News Weekly, November 29, 2007]

I have been concerned for some time that these differing views could lead to a repeat of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In one scenario, despairing of getting us to understand why they see this deployment as threatening, the Russians ask how we would feel if they deployed a similar missile defense in Cuba. While these Cuban missiles would be only hypothetical and defensive in nature, our nation might well see just the suggestion as intolerable. We might therefore respond in a forceful manner so that, to maintain face, Russia felt it had to deploy at least a token missile defense system. If that happened, the resultant crisis could well end with us reimposing a naval blockade of Cuba, at which point there would be a high risk of further escalation. While such a scenario may at first sound improbable, as detailed in section 3 of this primer it is very similar to the progression of events that resulted in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

Somewhat ominously, several months after I first voiced the above concern, Russian President Vladimir Putin likened the current American deployment to the Cuban Missile Crisis:

I recall how things went in a similar situation in the mid 1960s. Similar actions by the Soviet Union, when it put rockets in Cuba, precipitated the Cuban Missile Crisis. For us the technological aspects of the situation are very similar. We have removed the remnants of our bases from Vietnam and dismantled them in Cuba, yet such threats for our country are today being created on our own borders. [Putin, October 26, 2007]

Putin disclaimed that such a crisis could occur in the friendlier climate that currently exists, but those good relations are clearly fraying. Further evidence of the decline in Russian-American relations came in November 2007 when, partly in response to this missile defense system, Russia unilaterally "suspended" implementation of its commitments under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe or CFE [Pravda, November 30, 2007]. In December 2007, events deteriorated further when Russia noted that it might target the system should it be deployed [Reuters, December 17, 2007].

NOTE ADDED AUGUST 2008: Recent developments have realized some of my worst fears and point to a rapidly increasing risk on our present course. For details see email #4 sent to participants in this project.

On January 30, 2008, at the Russia Forum in Moscow, former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov stated:

Russia's military doctrine, in conditions in which its armed forces are being reduced, is known to envisage the possibility of using nuclear weapons. But this is only on condition of an attack on it and its allies, and only against countries that also possess nuclear weapons. ... In this (Russia's) military doctrine is no different from the military doctrines of other nuclear states. [Primakov is probably referring to the fact that the U.S. has always rejected calls for a policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons.] ... This policy – anti-Russian – increases the chances of "a fatal accident." The world may be made to face the threat of a global conflict without anyone whatsover wanting it. [Interfax, January 30, 2008]

In the U.S., presidential candidate Barak Obama had to back pedal after initially saying in an interview that he would not use nuclear weapons against terrorists in Afghanistan or Pakistan. His opponent for the Democratic nomination, Hillary Rodham Clinton, attacked that position, saying,“I think that presidents should be very careful at all times in discussing the use or non-use of nuclear weapons. Presidents, since the Cold War, have used nuclear deterrence to keep the peace. And I don’t believe that any president should make any blanket statements with respect to the use or non-use of nuclear weapons.” [New York Times, August 3, 2007]

Turning to the question raised in the title of this section "Why worry about nuclear weapons now? Isn’t the Cold War over?", an ominous chill is descendeding once more on Russian-American relations. The nuclear threat didn't die with the fall of the Berlin Wall. At best, it merely went into hibernation.